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IMPRUDENT POWER CONSTRUCTION
PROJECTS: THE MALAISE OF
TRADITIONAL PUBLIC UTILITY POLICIES
Gary D. Allison*
INTRODUCTION

Bailouts or bankruptcy? Economically unfortunate investments
in nuclear powered electric generating facilities forced many public
utility policymakers to confront this Hobson's choice during the last
ten years. This Article is not concerned with how public utility
policymakers should resolve bankruptcy-bailout dilemmas. Instead,
the Article focuses on how the nation can avoid making the inappropriate electric power investment decisions that lead to these
dilemmas.
The present public utility policy is functionally incompatible
with emerging economic and technological realities. This policy-reality dichotomy is the major reason why so many disastrous electric
power investments were made over the last decade. In order for public utility decisionmakers to make optimal utility investment decisions in the future, a new public utility policy framework must be
developed. This Article describes the dominant twentieth century
public utility policy framework, compares emerging economic and
technological trends with the conditions and assumptions that gave
rise to such a framework, and outlines a new public utility policy
framework for the twenty-first century.
I.

PRESENT PUBLIC UTILITY POLICY: THE TRADITIONAL
FRAMEWORK

The dominant public utility policy framework now in existence
was constructed from six regulatory building blocks: (1) calculation
* B.A., J.D., University of Tulsa; LL.M., Columbia University. Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. The author is indebted to Commissioners Bill Dawson, Norma
Eagleton, and Hamp Baker for the opportunity to serve the Oklahoma Corporation Commission as Special Counsel (1979-81) on utility policy.
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of rates on the basis of average costs of service;1 (2) evaluation of
utility company investors' rates of return by public finance standards; 2 (3) grants of exclusive service area franchises to electric
power generators;3 (4) mandatory public utility service for anyone
requesting it;4 (5) determination of the reasonableness of utility construction projects on the basis of facts considered during construction
certification proceedings; 5 and (6) discouragement of diversification
by electric power companies into related businesses. 6 Each of these
1. See, e.g., In re Consolidated Edison Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 475, 478-79 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1975).
2. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
The Court emphasized that rates set by the regulatory commissions "which enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed certainly cannot be condemned as invalid, even
though they might produce only a meager return on the so-called 'fair value' rate base." Id. at
605. As applied, the Hope standard created a cost of capital approach that limits utilities'
rates of return to the level needed to service their imbedded debt and secure equity investment.
Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 31 P.U.R.4th 15, 50-64 (Pa.
P.U.C. 1978). Therefore, rates of return are simply one of the costs utilities are entitled to
recover, rather than a reward limited only by the companies' revenues and costs, as they are
for unregulated firms.
3. See, e.g., Retail Electric Supplier Certified Territory Act, OKLA. STAT., tit. 17, §§
158.21-.32, 158.24(A) (Supp. 1981). This Act was passed in 1971 because the legislature felt
that it was
in the public interest that, in order to encourage the orderly development of coordinated statewide retail electric service, to avoid wasteful duplication of distribution
facilities, to avoid unnecessary encumbering of the landscape of the State of
Oklahoma, to prevent the waste of materials and natural resources, for the public
convenience and necessity and to minimize disputes between retail electric suppliers
which may result in inconvenience, diminished efficiency and higher costs in serving
the consumer, the state be divided into geographical areas, establishing the unincorporated areas within which each retail electric supplier is to provide the retail electric service as provided in this act.
Id..at § 158.23.
4. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Maine Pub. Serv. Co., 223 A.2d 435, 438-40 (Me. 1966);
Preston County Light & Power Co. v. Renick, 145 W. Va. 115, 120-24, 113 S.E.2d 378, 38387 (1960).
5. See, e.g., In re Rochester Gas & Elec. Co., 41 P.U.R.4th 438 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1981). The issue here is who bears the cost of inappropriate utility construction initiated under a validly issued certificate of public convenience and necessity. Generally, certificates of public convenience and necessity provide contemporaneous regulatory judgments that
there is a need for the utility project and that the construction plan is reasonable. Such a
regulatory judgment provides utilities with regulatory justification for recovery of construction
costs even though the finished construction project proves to be suboptimal. Id. at 442-46.
See also In re Consolidated Edison Co., 73 P.U.R.3d 417, 429-42 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1968) (inclusion of nuclear power plant in electric company's rate base deemed reasonable even though subsequent experience proved that original selection of fuel was uneconomical); Waukesha Gas & Elec. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 181 Wis. 281, 301, 194 N.W.
846, 854 (1923) (whether investment is prudent must be determined as of time it was made).
6. Examples of state regulatory measures that tend to discourage utility company diver-
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building blocks depends upon predictable economic growth and stable energy prices for its social utility.
A.

Average Cost Pricing

In any given year, a utility company operates with a capital asset base that was acquired over a significant period of time and pursification include:
(1) Limiting the costs of purchases from affiliated companies that a utility can
recover in its rates to below market value levels. See, e.g., In re MontanaDakota Utils. Co., 278 N.W.2d 189, 192-93 (S.D. 1979).
(2) Lowering the rate of return an affiliated company is entitled to earn, by double
leveraging calculations that take into account the capital structure of the affiliate's parent company in determining the affiliate's cost of equity capital. This
double leveraging lowers the affiliate's rate of return, by limiting the affiliate's
cost of equity capital to the parent's weighted cost of capital. See, e.g., New
England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 390 A.2d 8, 39-43 & n.24
(Me. 1978); Potomac Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 369 A.2d 1035,
1040 (Md. 1977); Copeland, Double Leverage One More Time, PuB. UTIL
FORT., Aug. 18, 1977, at 19, 20.

(3) Including the returns of nonutility investments (dividends or profits) in utility
income for ratemaking purposes. By including nonutility returns in the utilities' ratemaking income calculations, regulators inflate the utilities' jurisdictional revenues and thereby reduce the jurisdictional rates. United Transit Co.
v. Nunes, 99 R.I. 501, 505-11, 209 A.2d 215, 218-21 (1965); In re Southbridge Water Supply Co., 57 P.U.R.3d 488, 491 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils.
1965).
(4) Attributing equal profitability to jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional operations
for purposes of calculating jurisdictional revenue needs, when nonjurisdictional
operations earn actual returns less than the allowable return on jurisdictional
operations. This practice reduces the estimation of revenues needed to finance
jurisdictional operations, a reduction that results in lower jurisdictional rates
that compensate jurisdictional customers for their forced subsidization of the
less profitable nonjurisdictional operations. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v.
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 37 P.U.R.4th 381, 398-99 (Pa. P.U.C. 1980).
(5) Regulating affiliated companies on the same cost of service basis as their parents when it is determined that the parent and the affiliate are substantially
integrated. See Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 331
U.S. 682, 684-93 (1947); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 324 U.S. 581, 595-604 (1945); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 607-15 (1944).
(6) Removing unprofitable nonutility functions from the rate base, especially when
they involve industries that are not regulated. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n
v. Duquesne Light Co., 43 P.U.R.4th 27, 87-93 (Pa. P.U.C. 1981).
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1984), imposes
significant restrictions on utility diversifications to the extent that they will be accomplished
through the holding company mechanism. As defined by the Act, holding companies have
control over 10% or more of the voting securities of a public utility or another holding company, or controlling influence over a utility company or a holding company. 15 U.S.C. §
79b(a)(7). Because of the intricacies and complexities of the Act, it is beyond the scope of this
Article. Further discussion of utility diversification will focus solely on state regulation.
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chased at prices varying significantly from year to year.7 A company
also acquires rights to services and resources needed to operate its
facilities. It finances its acquisitions of assets, services and resources
by acquiring funds at various times and under various terms from a
wide variety of sources."
Traditional utility regulation limits the total revenues a utility
company is entitled to receive from its customers to the reasonably
contemporaneous costs of doing business.9 These reasonably contemporaneous costs represent an averaging of historic costs incurred by
the company over many time periods. 10 Under this rate methodology,
the company is entitled to a return only on the ratemaking value of
its capital assets, a calculation that relies in varying degrees on the
book value or historic cost of the company's plant-in-service.1 Depreciation as an operating expense is usually calculated on the basis
of the original costs of depreciating assets. 2 Operating expenses reflect the blending of different technologies available for performing
identical tasks, since technology advances over time and the utility
gradually replaces old technology with the new. Finally, the rate of
return a company is deemed entitled to is a weighted average of the
7.

M.

FARRIS

& R. SAMPSON, PUBLIC UTILITIES: REGULATION, MANAGEMENT AND

82-83 (1973).
K. HOWE & E7 RASMUSSEN,

OWNERSHIP

8.

PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 5 (1982).

9. See generally P. GARFIELD& V, LOVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 12-13, 44-46
(1964) (discussing the rates charged by a utility company as a function of the company's total
cost of service); K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 8, at 70-71. See also Ohio Edison Co.
v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 173 Ohio St. 478, 485, 184 N.E.2d 70, 76 (1962) (public utility rate

base should be calculated on the basis of reproduction cost less depreciation).
10. Utilities are required to justify their rate requests on the basis of their revenue and
cost experience over a test year that usually includes the 12 months preceding the utility rate
request. See W. JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REGULATED INDUSTRIES 128 (1976) Recently, some jurisdictions have adopted future test year ratemaking. See K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 8, at 71.

11. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944), provides the
basis for using book values or historical costs as the measure of the company's rate base.
Jurisdictions using this methodology calculate the company's rate base by subtracting accumulated depreciation from the original costs of the plant in service. See, e.g., In re CaliforniaPacific Utils. Co., 91 P.U.R.3d 171, 176-77 (Or. P.U.C. 1971). Most states refuse to include
in the rate base capitalized costs relating to equipment that is not providing adequate service,
see, e.g., In re Bell Tel. Co., 75 P.U.R.3d 92, 98-99 (Nev. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1968), or costs
of equipment in excess of amounts the public utility commission deems reasonable. See, e.g., In
re Detroit Edison Co., 24 P.U.R.4th 362, 368-70 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1978).
12. Ohio Edison Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 173 Ohio St. 478, 490-92, 184 N.E.2d 70,
79-80 (1962). Contra Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Ft. Dodge, 248 Iowa 1201,
1243, 85 N.W.2d 28, 52 (1957) (allowance of depreciation as an operating expense should be
based on present value, rather than on original costs, where the company's rate base is valued
on a fair value basis).

19851

IMPRUDENT POWER PROJECTS

terms under which the company has acquired funds over time, with
the return to common stockholders usually the only current cost of
money figure used.13

Asset prices tend to vary significantly from year to year.1 4 Technological advances permit the company to perform the same task
with less cost. 15 Interest rates and investor expectations also change

significantly over time.18 As a consequence, the traditional rate

methodology rarely leads to rates which equal the company's costs of

providing marginal units of service (marginal costs of service).17
Under historic average cost ratemaking, as the company's output ex-

pands it will receive returns in excess of those allowable when marginal costs are falling, but will experience revenue shortfalls when
marginal costs are rising. From the perspective of consumers, the
price of utility services is higher than it should be when marginal
costs are falling, but underpriced when marginal costs are rising.18
In short, depending upon the relationship of the company's average
costs and marginal costs, in any given year the utility will supply less
than or more than a competitive output level of service, at prices
above or below a competitive market price.

13. See supra note 2.
14. See generally E. MCKEAGE, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATORY LAW 63-80 (1956) (the
uncertainty that exists in valuing public utility property makes the courts' task of passing upon
reasonable rates very difficult).
15. K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 8, at 18-19. See also Schwartz, Impact of
Technological Change on Pricing in the Energy Industries and the Regulatory Response, in
ESSAYS ON PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING AND REGULATION 255-57 (H. Trebing ed. 1971).
16. K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 8, at 114-19.
17. In re Consolidated Edison Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 475, 480 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1975). Marginal costs of service are the costs associated with providing the next unit of service. Id. If utility rates are set in accordance with marginal costs of service, the overall revenues allowable will be meaningless as a restraint on utility rates. However, traditional utility
ratemaking practices give their highest priority to setting rates that will generate revenues no
greater than those set by test year calculations. Each rate, theoretically, will provide the same
rate of return as the overall allowed rate of return. Departures from this standard occur as
socio-economic-political conditions pressure commissions to collect less than the allowed rate of
return from some customers, and more than the allowed rate of return from others.
18. See Baumol, Rate Making: Incremental Costing and Equity Considerations, in
ESSAYS ON PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING AND REGULATION 141-44 (H. Trebing ed. 1971). See
also K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 8, at 186-91 (if regulators were able to monitor
and adjust rates, they would select a price equal to average costs); Wilder, Marginal CostPricing- Theory and Practice, in CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC-UTILITY ECONOMICS 169-76 (A.
Danielsen & D. Kamerschen eds. 1983) (consumer welfare will increase by expanding output
when price exceeds marginal cost).
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B. Public Finance Returns
The energy industry, like the transportation and communica-

tions industries, is generally regarded as providing services which are
public in nature.19 These infrastructure industries comprise the foundation of the nation's economic development, and furnish households
with essential services. Society demands that these essential services
be made widely available on a stable, nondiscriminatory basis.20 Historically, however, these industries experienced monopolistic market
structures, cartel activities, or alleged discriminatory behavior.2 1 The
private sector may be perceived by consumers as unable or unwilling
to provide an adequate supply of these essential services.2 2 Government regulation is the traditional response to such perceptions.
The goal of government regulation of public utilities is to provide society with utility services in larger amounts, at lower costs,
and under more stable conditions than would result from operation
of these industries in the free market.2 3 Therefore, investors in most
regulated companies are limited to the returns they could receive
from such low risk investments as government debt instruments or
the debt instruments and common stock of mature and stable companies.24 This is especially true in industries where regulation has
19. See Phillips, The Changing Environment of Public Utility Regulation: An Overview, in CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC-UTILITY ECONOMICS 25-34 (A. Danielsen & D. Kamerschen eds. 1983). See also K. HowE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 8, at 3 (important difference betwen gas and electric utilities and telephone utilities is that former are basically one
product industries, while latter is multiproduct, and, therefore, different regulatory and economic issues bear on each).
20. P. GARFIELD & W. LovEJoy, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 2-3, 12-13 (1964).
21. See Boyer, Testing the Applicability of the Natural Monopoly Concept, in APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES IN PUBLIC UTILITY INDUSTRIES 1-13 (W. Sichel & T. Gies
eds. 1981); P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, supra note 20, at 15-27; K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN,
supra note 8, at 1-3, 42-50. One economic rationale for the monopolization of public utilities is
that a single supplier can achieve lower unit costs than several competitive firms serving the
market. Id. at 19.
22. K. HowE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 8, at 2. Commentators have noted that
"[c]ompelling economic and physical factors rule out all but the monopolistic form of market
organization in the supply of local public utility services." P. GARFIELD & W. LovEJoY, supra
note 20, at 15.
23. See generally Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22
(1971); Mushkin & Bird, Public Prices: An Overview, in PUBLIC PRICES FOR PUBLIC PRODucTs 3-25 (S. Mushkin ed. 1972); Milliman, Beneficiary Charges - Toward a Unified Theory, in PUBLIC PRICES FOR PUBLIC PRODUCTS 27-51 (S. Mushkin ed. 1972); Vickrey, Economic Efficiency and Pricing,in PUBLIC PRICES FOR PUBLIC PRODUCTS 53-72 (S. Mushkin ed.
1972).
24. See Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 31 P.U.R.4th 15, 5064 (Pa. P.U.C. 1978).

1985]

IMPRUDENT POWER PROJECTS

been justified on the grounds of preventing monopolization or protecting producers from destructive competition. Such regulation is
premised on a government-producer contract that provides the producer with protection from competition and provides the public with
essential services at the lowest possible rates.25
C. Exclusive Service Area Franchises
To insure stability, traditional utility regulation affords regulated companies considerable freedom from intraindustry competition. In some regulated industries, most notably surface transportation, regulation was extended to competing forms of service in order
to protect companies from vigorous interindustry competition as
well.2 6 State and local governments often grant electric power companies and natural gas companies exclusive service area franchises
that insulate them from intraindustry competition over significant
time periods. 27 Public utility commissions have sometimes adopted
ratemaking policies designed to discourage price competition between electric power and natural gas service.28
D. Service to All
The requirement that utility companies provide service to the
public on demand was derived from the early common law rules forbidding discrimination by persons engaged in providing common services such as innkeeping, carriage service, and warehousing.29 This
nondiscrimination requirement was imposed on common trades not
only because they solicited business from the general public, but also
because they provided services considered essential to economic life
and, in some cases, to life itself.30
The nondiscriminatory service requirement imposed on utilities
25. See Dickinson v. Maine Pub. Serv. Co., 223 A.2d 435, 437-38 (Me. 1966); E. CLEMENS. ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 25-28 (1950).
26. See 2 A.E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS
178-93 (1970).
27. See supra note 3.
28. See In re Southern Cal. Edison Co., 90 P.U.R.3d 1, 21-23 (Cal. P.U.C. 1971). The
California Commission rejected an electric company's request that customers for whom natural gas was a reasonable energy option receive rate increases less than the company-wide increases, to avoid customer losses. The Commission was concerned that beneficial rates for favored customers would result in competing utilities demanding the right to offer comparable
rates, so that lower rates to the competitive customers would impose higher rates on the captive customers of each system. Id.
29. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124-30 (1876).
30. Id.
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a duty to serve on equal terms all who were willing and able to pay a
fair price.31 Even when prices were attacked as unfairly high, no one
was permitted to receive service at a price below the costs of service,
or significantly below the price paid by others.32
During the twentieth century, public utility policymakers expanded the universal requirement beyond its original nondiscrimination purpose. Regulators enlisted public utilities in the cause of stimulating economic growth. 33 In pursuit of the goal of serving all who
demanded service, regulators required utility companies to expand
their facilities to accommodate the higher demands for utility services that usually accompany economic expansion. 34 If the new facilities constructed to serve new demands were more costly than the
facilities used to service historic demands, the utility companies were
permitted to spread the higher costs of new facilities over their entire
customer base. 35 Through such rolled-in-cost decisions, historic cus31. See Cedar Island Improvement Ass'n v. Clinton Elec. Light & Power Co., 4
P.U.R.3d 65, 70 (Conn. P.U.C. 1954).
32. Id. at 71-72.
33. See, e.g., In re Tampa Elec. Co., 37 P.U.R.3d 65 (Fla. R.R. & P.U.C. 1960). Concern over economic development was a major factor in the Florida Commission's decision to
lower the electric power rates of large industrial customers. Id. at 69-72, 78-79. Registering its
concern, the Commission noted:
The general manager of Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce testified that the
first question asked of the chamber of commerce by a prospective new industry,
after the new industry has analyzed the market for its product, is the cost of utility
rates; that it is the position of the chamber of commerce that industrial development
is absolutely essential to the economic growth and welfare of the Tampa bay area,
that the commission should take that into consideration in reaching a decision in
this matter; and that in inducing industry to come into the area, the community
must provide adequate utilities at rates which are favorably comparative with other
areas of the state, the region, and the nation as a whole. It is clear that there is
keen competition between Floridaand all other sections of the country for industry
of all kinds, and the role of Tampa Electric in that competition is readily
apparent.
Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
34. See South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 352 So. 2d 999,
1005-06 (La. 1977); Ex parte South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 41 P.U.R.4th 298, 300-04 (La. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1981).
35. In In re Southern Cal. Edison Co., 90 P.U.R.3d 1 (Cal. P.U.C. 1971), the agricultural intervenors contended that they should not have to contribute to the financing of new
facilities since they would not use them. In response, the Commission stated that "[p]ersons
taking service under the agricultural and pumping schedule are getting good service because
Edison has a system that is up-to-date and being constantly improved. Everybody must pay for
this improvement." Id. at 24-25. See also South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 352 So. 2d 999 (La. 1977). The court stated: "[S]hould the expenditure necessary
to implement this [full service] order adversely affect its earnings (return on equity), the appropriate proceeding by which the company may seek relief is the institution of a rate proceed-
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tomers were forced to subsidize new economic growth. Utilities and

their historic customers were forced to assume a large part of the
risks associated with providing electric service to new business enterprises. Short-term economic expansions may not have long-term
staying power. If short-term surges in demand for utility services terminate before the end of the useful lives of the facilities built to
serve them, the utility companies and their remaining customers may
be left with the financial burden of supporting redundant utility
facilities.
Despite the risks of redundancy inherent in expanding utility
services to serve new business customers, utility companies have been
given little discretion by regulatory commissions to decide whether
new service demands are sufficiently stable to warrant an investment

in new utility facilities. Rather, when new demands have overextended existing utility facilities, regulators, for the most part, have

required utility expansion without questioning whether the new demand levels would be sustained over the life of the new facilities.36
In fact, regulators established ratemaking guidelines that per-

mitted utilities to pass on to their remaining customers the costs of
utility facilities that became redundant because of declining demand.37 Backed by this cost coverage regulatory policy, utilities had
little incentive to question the stability of new demands for utility

service. Instead, utilities responded almost automatically to shortterm increases in demands for utility services with new utility coning." Id. at 1006 (footnote omitted). Accord Hogan v. Hampden Tel. Co., 36 P.U.R.4th 480,
485 (Me. P.U.C. 1980); Pollis v. New England Tel. Co., 25 P.U.R.4th 529, 534 (Me. P.U.C.
1978).
36. See Wisconsin State Rural Electrification Coordination Comm. v. Wisconsin Gas &
Elec. Co., 17 P.U.R. 31, 36 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1936). The case of In re Tampa Elec.
Co., 37 P.U.R.3d 65 (Fla. R.R. & P.U.C. 1960), is particularly revealing with regard to utility
reflex reaction to contemporaneous growth. In Tampa, the Commission noted that between
1954 and 1960, 123 new industries moved into the Tampa area; in addition, existing industries
made 125 major expansions. Id. at 70. These new locations and expansions resulted in about
$204.7 million in new investment, $26.5 million in new annual payrolls, and 4,600 new industrial jobs. Id. In response to projected industrial growth, Tampa Electric added six new generating units between 1945 and 1957. Id. at 77. Yet, by 1960, several major industries were
resisting electric rate increases on grounds that competitive pressures from firms located
outside the Tampa area, and in some cases outside the United States, were affecting their
abilities to either expand or maintain their facilities. Id. at 71 (steel industry); id. at 71-72
(phosphate industry); id. at 74 (cement industry). The problem Tampa Electric faced was
that, absent rate concessions, many industrial customers were threatening to leave its system.
This would have resulted in revenue shortfalls that could only be remedied by passing rate
increases on to its remaining customers. Id. at 78-80.
37. See, e.g., In re Tampa Elec. Co., 37 P.U.R.3d 65, 78-80 (Fla. R.R. & P.U.C. 1960).
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struction projects.38
Government often interfered in the marketplace to stimulate economic development in sparsely settled, undeveloped areas of the
country. Regulators have used public utility companies to further
such development goals by defining utility service areas broadly
enough to include areas where utilities would not have voluntarily
offered services if left to exercise their own business judgments.3 9 To
buttress these development tactics, regulators commanded utilities to
provide service to undeveloped areas at rates that produced little or
no return on the utility investments involved.40 The utilities were
permitted, however, to charge customers in developed areas rates

with abnormally high profit margins, as compensation for the low
rate of return received from serving the undeveloped areas.4
In addition to subsidizing development, burdened classes of
ratepayers have had to cross-subsidize customers allegedly unable to
pay a fully-allocated rate for utility services. Financially distressed
business customers were successful in acquiring reduced rates, sometimes for years. 2 More recently, the concept of lifeline rates was
developed as a means of securing affordable utility service for low
income households.4 3 Many lifeline rate proposals involve cross-subsidies favoring low income households and burdening businesses and
38. See, e.g., In re Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 41 P.U.R.4th 438, 441-46 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1981) (utility incurred substantial costs in planning for a new facility despite
serious questions concerning the true need for the facility).
39. See Crowell v. Hackensack Water Co., 73 P.U.R.3d 406, 408-09 (N.J. Bd. Pub.
Util. Comm'rs 1968) (water company ordered to provide service to customers where unserviced property was within a reasonable distance of existing facilities, the expansion was financially feasible, it would generate enough business to justify itself, and public convenience and
necessity demanded it); In re Nucla-Naturita Tel. Co., 33 P.U.R.3d 278, 282 (Colo. P.U.C.
1960) (utility can be required to expand if services are needed and costs are reasonable).
40. In re Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 28 P.U.R.3d 155, 155-56 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Util.
Comm'rs 1959). See supra note 39.
41. See supra note 39. See also General Tel. Co. v. Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 54
P.U.R.3d 210, 212-13 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1964) (holding that commissioner's policy of extending
service to all rural subscribers justifies increase in rates to original subscribers).
42. See In re Utah Power & Light Co., 22 P.U.R.4th 351, 373-74 (Idaho P.U.C. 1977);
In re Alabama Power Co., 83 P.U.R.3d 321, 351-52 (Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1969); In re
Tampa Elec. Co., 37 P.U.R.3d 65, 71-72, 74, 78-80 (Fla. R.R. & P.U.C. 1960).
43. See, e.g., Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, § 114, 16 U.S.C. § 2624(b)
(1982) (commanding state utility commissions and unregulated utility systems to consider
whether lifeline rates should be adopted within a two year period commencing Nov. 9, 1978).
For a succinct overview of lifeline rates, their purposes, implementation methods, and regulatory issues, see

NATIONAL ENERGY LAW &

UTILITY REGULATORY

POLICIES ACT

OF

POLICY INSTITUTE, IMPLEMENTING THE PUBLIC

1978

IN OKLAHOMA §§

IV(1)-IV(11) (1980).
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affluent individuals. 44
Thus, a regulatory concept intended to prevent discrimination in

the provision of essential services developed into a system of complex
cross-subsidies designed to further governmental objectives of economic development and social welfare. These cross-subsidy systems
are protected by exclusive service area franchises which insulate utilities from competition for the business of their burdened ratepayers.
E. New Construction Approvals
Consistent with public utility regulators' development and wel-

fare goals, certificates of public convenience and necessity for new
utility construction projects were generally granted without much

controversy when construction plans were finalized.45 Once plans
were approved, the issues of the need for new facilities, the appropriateness of the utilities' choices of technology, and the economic feasibility of completing the construction projects successfully, were
deemed resolved. 46 If a project later proved to be undesirable, states

generally regarded themselves as estopped from challenging the utility's right to put the new construction into operation and its costs

into the utility's rate base. The theory of estoppel was based on the
states' previous rulings, in certification proceedings, that the decision

to initiate the construction project was reasonable.47
Obviously, this regulatory policy places most of the risk that

changing conditions will render new construction projects unnecessary or uneconomic on the utility's ratepayers. This risk increases
geometrically as the time span between the start of a utility con-

struction project and its introduction into service lengthens.48
44. Indeed, § 114 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §
2624(a) (1982), states explicitly that lifeline rates below utility costs of service do not violate
federal rate design standards. See generally In re Gas & Elec. Util. Rate Structure, 24
P.U.R.4th 332 (Cal. P.U.C. 1978) (determining whether various lifeline rates are reasonable).
Note especially the dissenting opinion of Commissioners Symons and Sturgeon, id. at 347-48.
45. For a general discussion of certificates of public convenience and necessity, see K.
HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 8, at 271-75. The regulatory commission has reasonable
latitude in granting these certificates, and absolute or indispensible public need is not a prerequisite. The utility need only show public expedience, reasonable benefit, or the prevention of
detriment to the public. Id. at 274.
46. Id. at 271-75. Contra In re Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 41 P.U.R.4th 438, 441-42
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981) (commission initially granted approval, but upon reconsidering the need for the proposed facilities, vacated its approval).
47. See supra note 5.
48. This increase in risks is caused by the difficulty of forecasting future events. As the
forecasting horizon expands, chances of an inaccurate forecast increase significantly, since economic, political and technological conditions are changing rapidly. Koreisha & Stobaugh, Ap-
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F. Diversification Disincentives
The stability goals of public utility policymakers are important
factors in the formation of regulatory policies that discouraged utility companies from engaging in diverse business operations. Historically, nonutility businesses involved greater risks than utility businesses. 48 Therefore, successful utility company investments in
nonutility businesses generated higher rates of return than investments in utility operation. Regulators feared that this opportunity to
earn higher rates of return through nonutility investments might divert utility companies' capital from desirable reinvestments in their
utility operations.50
Given the higher risks associated with them, nonutility investments were more likely to lead to capital losses than were utility
investments. When losses occurred, capital was lost that otherwise
would have been available for reinvestment in the utility sector. In
addition, when utilities that diversified suffered significant losses
through poor nonutility investments, they experienced greater difficulty acquiring capital on favorable terms for their utility operations,
and the capital costs borne by their ratepayers increased. These adverse results led regulators to regard utility company investments in
nonutility businesses as ventures that involuntarily forced ratepayers
to assume greater risks of either receiving inadequate service or paying higher than normal utility rates.51 As a consequence, regulators
imposed constructive trust-type policies on utility companies' nonutility investments, so that ratepayers were credited with nonutility
profits while stockholders were inflicted with nonutility losses.52 This
"heads I win, tails you lose" approach gradually became an effective
disincentive to utility company diversification.
Often, utilities chose to diversify by affiliating with companies
that produce coal, oil, or natural gas. These affiliated companies provide utilities with fuel resources critical to their operations.53 Such
investments present utilities with incentives to purchase services and
pendix: Limits of Models, in ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE
HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL 234-65 (R. Stobaugh & D. Yergin eds. 1979).
49. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Duquesne Light Co., 43 P.U.R.4th 27,
87-89 (Pa. P.U.C. 1981) (describing the high risks encountered in the coal mining industry).
50. See D. HAWES, UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIES §§ 4.02[3], 6.03 (1984).
51. Id. at 3.05[2], 4.02[3], and 6.03.
52. See United Transit Co. v. Nunes, 99 R.I. 501, 209 A.2d 215 (1965); Pennsylvania
Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Duquesne Light Co., 43 P.U.R.4th 27 (Pa. P.U.C. 1981); In re Southbridge Water Supply Co., 57 P.U.R.3d 488 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Utils. 1965).
53. This practice is known as backward integration.
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supplies from their affiliated companles which could be acquired on
better terms from unaffiliated suppliers. To protect ratepayers and
the competitors of utility company affiliates from the abuses inherent
in sweetheart arrangements between utilities and their affiliates, regulators subject utility-affiliate transactions to stricter scrutiny than
other utility business transactions. 4 In many cases, regulators also
subject the affiliated suppliers to utility type profit controls.5 Since
the industries in which affiliates operate generally involve greater
risks than the utility sector, limiting affiliated suppliers to utility
profit levels is an effective way of discouraging utilities from investing in these industries. In addition, utilities making these investments frequently are prohibited from passing on to their customers,
in the form of higher rates, the entire cost of the supplies they
purchase from their affiliates. In all cases, utility-affiliate supply
transactions are subjected to greater regulatory scrutiny than are
other utility supply arrangements. 6
II.

CHANGING TIMES FOR THE PUBLIC UTILITY INDUSTRY HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

AN

The six regulatory building blocks outlined above form the
framework for the dominant public utility policy used in the United
States in this century. This policy was developed in response to economic and technological conditions that once existed, but changed
substantially over the past two decades. A brief overview of these
changing conditions reveals that the public utility policy now employed in this country is no longer appropriate.
A.

The Golden Age

Current public utility policy is premised on conditions which existed during what might be called the "golden age" of public utilities. This "golden age" lasted roughly from the end of World War II
until 1973, when the Arab Oil Embargo changed the pattern of energy use world-wide. During these years, utilities enjoyed declining
cost structures, increasing demands, and the goodwill of investors,
ratepayers and politicians.
54.
55.
(1947);
(1945);
56.
HAWES,

D. HAWES, supra note 50, at §§ 10.01-10.03.
See Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682, 684-93
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 581, 595-604
Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 607-15 (1944).
See In re Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 278 N.W.2d 189, 192-93 (S.D. 1979); D.
supra note 50 at §§ 10.01-10.03.
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Utility cost structures declined during the postwar era, primarily because technological advances permitted utilities to achieve
greater economies of scale by building larger power plants.57 These
economies of scale exerted downward pressures on utilities' operating
costs. Operating costs were further minimized by such factors as low
58
interest rates, low inflation, and low oil and gas prices.
High and stable rates of growth in the general United States
economy stimulated increased demands for electricity. 59 By accommodating these higher demands for electricity through the construction of large, high technology power plants, utilities not only fulfilled
their duty to serve all demands, they also realized important cost
savings. 0 This combination of factors - declining cost structures
and increasing demands for service - made utilities an attractive
investment. 6' Established electric rates, based on historic costs that
were higher than the actual costs of operating new plants, were more
than adequate to finance both current operations and the construction of new power plants, while simultaneously providing investors
with attractive returns on their investments.6 2 Rate cases were rarely
filed, and when they were, they often resulted in rate decreases.6 3
It is not surprising that utilities enjoyed immense goodwill from
investors, ratepayers, and politicians. Increased electrical demands
were met quickly by the utilities with newer and larger power plants;
the newer and larger power plants produced cost savings enabling
the utilities to provide attractive returns to investors; and the ratepayers enjoyed increased service at constant or declining rates.
Utilities had reason to believe that this idyll would last indefinitely. Throughout the expansionary postwar era, demands for energy, especially electricity, grew at a rate substantially equal to the
nation's overall economic growth rates.6 4 Some commentators suggested that this direct one-to-one relationship was an ironclad eco57. See A. CARRON & P. MACAVOY,

THE DECLINE OF SERVICE IN THE REGULATED

INDUSTRIES 15-17 (1981).

58. Id. at 15, 33-34.
59. Id. at 15-17.
60. Id. at 23-26.
61. Id.at 25.
62. Id.at 21-22.
63. Id. at 19-20. See Joskow, Electric Utility Rate Structures in the United States:

Some Recent Developments, in PUBLIC UTILITY RATE MAKING INAN ENERGY-CONSCIOUS
ENVIRONMENT 1, 2-3 (W. Sichel ed. 1979).
64. See Dohner, The Bedeviled American Economy, in GLOBAL INSECURITY: A STRATEGY FOR ENERGY & ECONOMIC RENEWAL 58,

69 (D. Yergin & M. Hillenbrand eds. 1982).
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nomic law. 65 According to this view, energy demands, especially
electricity demands, were so inelastic that they were practically nonresponsive to changes in price. 6 Based on this hypothesis,
econometric models were constructed which predicted that high rates
of growth in electricity production were essential to high rates of
economic growth, which would in turn create significant increases in
electricity demands.67
Buttressed by these econometric models and by the industry's
recent history, utilities initiated ambitious power plant construction
programs that state public utility commissioners were only too happy
to approve. 8 After all, for years new utility construction brought
nothing but increased economic growth and stable electricity rates
for every community. There was little reason to believe the future
would bring different results. Once the new power plant construction
plans were approved, everyone assumed that the utility-regulatorratepayer consensus for their completion would remain intact
throughout the construction period. But these assumptions were
proven inaccurate by the economic events of the early 1970's, and
the public utilities' "golden age" came to an abrupt end.
B.

The Age of Uncertainty

Unfortunately, the past was not an accurate reflection of the
future where electric power was concerned. In the early 1970's, a
number of factors reversed the public utility industry's history of declining costs, increasing demand, and goodwill. An era of turbulence
began which resulted in increased costs, decreased demand and, at
times, outright hostility on the part of the public, investors and
politicians.
In the postwar era, electric utilities had become increasingly reliant on natural gas and fuel oil as their primary fuel sources.69 The
65. See R. VIETOR, ENERGY POLICY IN AMERICA SINCE
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 317 (1984).
66.

1945: A

STUDY OF BUSINESS-

Id.

67. See, e.g., Koreisha & Stobaugh, Appendix: Limits to Models, in

ENERGY FUTURE:

305-37 (R. Stobaugh
& D. Yergin eds. 1979) (examples of econometric models). See generally A. LOVINS, SOFT
ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A DURABLE PEACE 63-72 (1977) (discussion on the use of models in
predicting energy future).
68. See K. ARROW, F. BATOR, K. DAM, R. FRI, E. FRIED, R. GARWIN, S. GOUSE, W.
REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL

HOGAN,

H.

LANDSBERG,

H.

PERRY,

G.

RATHJENS,

L.

RUFF, J. SAWHILL,

T.

SCHELLING,

R.

G. THOMPSON, J. WHITTENBERGER & M. WOLMAN, ENERGY: THE
NEXT TWENTY YEARS 421 (1979) [hereinafter cited as TWENTY YEARS].
69. See A. CARRON & P. MACAVOY, supra note 57, at 40-42. See also Lawrence &
STOBAUGH,

T.

TAYLOR,
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Arab Oil Embargo resulted in dramatic increases in the price of fuel
oil, coupled with shortages of fuel oil and natural gas supplies. 0 The
fuel costs of electric power plants skyrocketed. 7 1 These escalated fuel

costs often had to be absorbed by utility company shareholders because they occurred too quickly to be passed on through traditional

rate hearings. 72 As fuel costs continued to escalate, utilities were permitted to eventually pass them on directly to ratepayers through fuel

adjustment charges. 73 This created new problems. Unaccustomed to
rate increases as rapid and as high as those produced by fuel adjustment charges, utility ratepayers became more resistant to rate increase proposals and more active in elections involving public utility
commissions. They also utilized conservation programs designed to
reduce their demand for energy. Thus, the oil shortages of the early
1970's had a marked effect on utilities' costs, public image, and
demand.
Inflation also contributed to the problems experienced by the
public utility industry.74 In this high inflation period, even when pubDaneke, Issues Affecting the Decentralization of Energy Supply, in ENERGY POLICY AND
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 63-65 (G. Daneke & G. Lagassa eds. 1980) (noting continued
United States reliance on nonrenewable energy sources and the role of oil and natural gas in
formulating a decentralization policy).
70. Stobaugh, After the Peak: The Threat of Imported Oil, in ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL

16, 28 (R. Stobaugh &

D. Yergin eds. 1979). In the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the OPEC nations imposed a
short but disruptive oil embargo on the western nations and followed the embargo by raising
their "take" on oil from $1.77 to $7.00 per barrel. Id.
71. See A. CARRON & P. MACAVOY, supra note 57, at 41-42.
72. For a discussion of the concept of regulatory lag, see K. HowE & E. RASMUSSEN,
supra note 8, at 120.
73, For a discussion of the historical development of automatic adjustment clauses, see
M. SCHMIDT, AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENT CLAUSES: THEORY & APPLICATION 15-40 (1980)..
Fuel adjustment clauses were in existence for many decades but generally were triggered only
during highly inflationary periods. In the postwar era, fuel adjustment clauses were applied
mainly to industrial users, but were rarely triggered because productivity gains generally neutralized fuel cost increases, causing public utility commissions to be reluctant to allow the
clauses to be activated. Id. In the 1970's, fuel cost increases seriously eroded electric utility
earnings. Fuel adjustments were not only approved; they were activated as to all ratepayers by
most utility commissions. Id. at 59.
In the last decade, levels of inflation and fluctuations in the costs of capital caused some
commissions to experiment with service-at-cost adjustment clauses. These clauses permit utilities to adjust rates automatically whenever returns on equity fall outside a certain range. The
purpose of such clauses is to improve the ability of utilities to recover their legitimate costs so
that their quality of earnings will keep their capital costs as low as possible. See In re Public
Serv. Co., 50 P.U.R.4th 416, 418-20 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1982). For a summary of the
service-at-cost experiment in New Mexico, see id. at 418-30, 451.
74. See K. HOWE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 8, at 113-19; A. CARRON & P. MACAVoY, supra note 57, at 39-42.
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lic utility commissions permitted rates to be set by reference to current costs rather than historic average costs, the new rates became
obsolete as they went into effect.7 5 With their cost increases outstripping their rate increases, utilities rarely earned the allowed rate of
return on their investments.7 This erosion in their rates of return
made utilities less attractive to investors and caused capital acquisitions to become more difficult and expensive 77 High Lnflation also
caused dramatic escalation in utility construction costs. Labor contracts were usually indexed to provide workers with cost of living
increases equal to increases in inflation rates.78 The prices of materials needed for power plant construction projects escalated sharply as
well.79
Faced with operating costs rising more rapidly than allowed revenues, and with drastic increases in construction costs, utilities' cash
flow circumstances became desperate. Utility rates calculated on an
historic rate base were no longer sufficient to finance current operations and construction costs, and still provide the high returns necessary to attract sufficient capital investment. Utilities began to ask
regulators to allow them to include costs of construction work in progress (CWIP) in their rate bases as a means of recovering at least
the interest expenses associated with funds used during the construction period.8 0
This requested cost pass-through sharply deviated from past
regulatory practices. Historically, utilities were not allowed to include projects in their rate bases until they were put into service,
because sufficient revenue was generated by plants already in service.8 Sensing that they were being asked to pay something for
75. See D. DEVAUL, REGIONAL ENERGY ECONOMICS: THE IMPACT OF THE PRICE INCREASES OF THE 1970's 25-27 (1982).
76. A. CARRON & P. MACAVOY, supra note 57, at 39-45.
77. Id. at 42-48.
78. See Cook, Nuclear Follies, FORBES, Feb. 11, 1985, at 82.
79. Id.
80. For a typical case involving a utility company's CWIP request, and for a detailed
explanation of how CWIP works relative to traditional ratemaking practices, see In re Utah
Power & Light Co., 30 P.U.R.4th 197, 202-10 (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1979). When
granted, construction cost expenses are added to the utility company's rate base for rate making purposes. The effect is to compute the utility company's allowed rate of return as if the
plant under construction is partially in service. Inflating the rate base by adding construction
costs will often result in the utility company's receiving a higher rate increase than it otherwise
would receive. If construction costs of a plant under construction are included in the rate base
throughout the construction period, ratepayers will pay the entire capital cost associated with
the construction project, before it is put into service. Id. at 203-04.

81.

See id. at 202-10.
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nothing, ratepayers deeply resented CWIP and fiercely fought its implementation. 2 Resistance to CWIP often turned into resistance to
new utility construction projects, as ratepayers began to question not
only the right of utilities to charge them for the costs of equipment
not in service, but also the need for new construction. Even when the
need for new construction could be demonstrated, the costs of some
projects, especially nuclear power plant construction, were so high
that they could not be covered even if the utilities were granted maximum CWIP treatment of their construction costs. 83
Utility company construction of new power plants also created
problems. Nuclear and coal power plants presented huge environmental and safety risks. The resulting legislation and litigation
stretched out the time frames for securing permission to construct
new power plants, and for the actual construction, to lengths far beyond those historically experienced. 4 When combined with rising
capital, labor, and materials costs, the elongated construction time
frames caused overall utility construction costs to increase geometrically as each year passed. 5 The combination of rising utility construction costs and much slower growth in electricity demand fractured the utility-regulator-ratepayer consensus that utility
construction projects should be completed once they had been approved. Gradually, the inevitable break with the precedent of one
time approvals of proposed utility construction projects came, and
many utility projects were subjected to multiple reevaluations of
86
their desirability.
82. CWIP became so controversial in New Hampshire that it was a major issue in the
Governor's campaign of 1978. The incumbent vetoed a bill that would have prohibited the
capital costs of constructing the controversial Seabrook nuclear power plant from inclusion in
the constructing utility's rate base. The challenger, who ultimately prevailed, made CWIP an

issue after the utility began collecting $18 million in CWIP surcharges. See CWIPpled, NEwsWrEK, Oct. 23, 1978, at 48.

83. See Cook, supra note 78, at 96.
84.

See TWENTY YEARS, supra note 68, at 416, Table 12-1. Construction and licensing

time periods range from 10 to 12 years for nuclear power plants and from 6 to 10 years for
coal-fired power plants. Id.

85. See Cook, supra note 78, at 84-88, 92, 94, 96.
86. The reevaluations occurred in four major forms. First, commissions intervened in
certificated construction projects already underway to reassess whether changes in demand
rendered the power plant under construction unnecessary. See In re Rochester Gas & Elec.
Corp., 41 P.U.R.4th 438, 441-42 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981). Second, commissions reconsidered the question of need under the "used and useful" principle, and rejected inclusion
into the rate base of all or part of the construction costs of completed power plants, even where

the commission found that the utility company's decision to build the power plant was prudent.
See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 433 A.2d 620, 623-24 (Pa.
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Over a period of a few years, conditions in the public utilities
industry shifted from ideal to turbulent. Gradually, in response to
these problems, the industry moved toward a third stage, the age of

competition.
C.

The Age of Competition

Beginning in 1978, United States energy policy shifted away
from the redistribution of energy rents and toward adjusting the general economy to high price, high risk energy realities. This change in
energy policy chiefly involved phasing out price controls on oil and
natural gas, and subsidizing the development of renewable energy
resources.

87

The adjustment emphasis in current United States energy policy
was instrumental in bringing competitive conditions back to world
petroleum markets. Higher energy prices that resulted initially from
decontrol of oil and gas prices made energy efficiency a necessary
goal and encouraged the development of alternative energy re-

sources.88 Higher prices for traditional energy sources encouraged
the early development of these alternate sources. As a result, world-

wide gluts in petroleum products and natural gas asserted downward
pressures on world energy prices in ways that replaced OPEC price
fixing with lower real energy prices set by competitive market
forces. 89 It is now estimated that oil prices may continue to decline
Commw. Ct. 1981); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 55
P.U.R.4th 185, 198-202 (Pa. P.U.C. 1983). Third, in situations where utilities cancelled power
plants that were commenced with prior regulatory consent, commissions examined whether the
decision to cancel should have been made earlier, for purposes of determining whether part of
the costs of the cancelled power plant should be removed from the rate base. See In re Houston Lighting & Power Co., 50 P.U.R.4th 157, 197-202 (Tex. P.U.C. 1982); In re Rochester
Gas & Elec. Corp., 41 P.U.R.4th 438,446-49 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981). Finally, commissions and courts rejected any recovery of costs of abandoned or cancelled power plants,
even though the utility company's construction decisions were deemed prudent, on grounds
that ratepayers can be charged only for expenses associated with plants that are actually used
and useful. See Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 67 Ohio St. 2d 153,
162-68, 423 N.E.2d 820, 826-29 (1981); In re Pacific Power & Light Co., 53 P.U.R.4th 24,
27-31 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983).
87. See Allison, Energy Sectionalism: Economic Origins and Legal Responses, 38
S.W.L.J. 703, 720-25 (1984).

88. See Yergin, Crisis and Adjustment: An Overview, in GLOBAL INSECURITY: A
& EcoNomic RENEWAL 8 (D. Yergin & M. Hillenbrand eds. 1982).

STRATEGY FOR ENERGY

89. The OPEC market price for crude oil has been under constant pressure for the past
year. See Markets Reject OPEC Price Efforts, OIL & GAS J., Jan. 7, 1985, at 62. Effective
Feb. 1, 1985, OPECreduced the price on its marker - 34" Arab Light - to $28 per barrel,
down from the marker price of $29. This was only the second price cut in OPEC's 25-year
history. OPEC Price Cuts Draw Mixed Market Response, OIL & GAS J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 31.
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or to remain stable until 1990.90

Within the United States, lower energy prices are contributing
to strong economic growth and low rates of inflation.9 1 Energy demands are rising, but not in the historical one-to-one ratio with economic growth.92 Lower real prices of petroleum and natural gas are
also retarding the development of alternative energy sources. 93 While
current economic and energy conditions are favorable to consumers,
some fear that rising energy demands will combine with the delayed
development of alternative energy sources to produce another energy
The first, in March of 1983, cut the marker price from $34 to $29 per barrel. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 15, 1983, at AI, col. 6. See The Unriggingof Oil Prices, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 7, 1983, at
62-65; Oil Price to Hold, Merrill Lynch Says, But Fall to $15 Per Barrel Not Impossible, 11
ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 426 (April 21, 1983).
90. See Lichtblau: Market Won't Justify Higher Oil Prices, 81 OIL & GAS J., Jan. 31,
1983, at 42. John Lichtblau, the president of the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation,
Inc,, stated:
World demand for OPEC oil won't be close to the organization's productive
capacity because of structural changes brought about by two previous OPEC price
shocks and the shift away from energy intensive industry.
It is therefore time to revise the view, still widely held, that the present situation is but a brief hiatus in the trend of rapidly rising real oil prices which began in
1973 . ..
The 1980's are likely to be quite different from the 1970's.
Id.
91. For example, in 1984, the real gross national product grew at a rate of 5.6%, while
the inflation rate was only 3.5%. DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) Special Supp., Feb. 6, 1985, at S-2,
S-7.
92. Total energy consumption for 12 years ending in 1984 was as follows:
Year
Energy Consumption (Quads)
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

74.282
72.543
70.546
74.362
76.289
78.088
78.898
75.952
73.989
70.840
70.495
74.132
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., MONTHLY ENERGY REV., Sept., 1985, at 25. See ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMIN., 1983 ANNUAL REPORT, in MONTHLY ENERGY REV., Nov. 1984, at i
(reporting a 10-year decline in per capita energy use).
93. See, e.g., Reagan's Major Budget Proposalsfor Fiscal 1984, Wall St. J., Jan. 31,
1983, at 5, col. 6 (discussing President Reagan's 1984 budget proposals, including a proposed
60% cut in funding for solar, fossil, and other alternative energy research); Slow Growth Seen
for Synthetic Fuels, 81 OIL & GAS J., May 2, 1983, at 80 (discussing decreases in synthetic
fuel development).
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supply crisis by the mid-1990's.'4
Current competitive conditions within world energy markets are

contributing to the emergence of four major trends in the electric
utility sector. First, some utility systems are being rendered uncompetitive by the high construction costs of the past. 9 Second, many

utility companies are eschewing new utility construction in favor of
sponsoring energy conservation and efficiency programs and implementing competitive new rate designs that are structured to encourage full use of existing electric power facilities."6 Third, utilities
and their regulators are struggling to develop policies that will per-

mit alternatives to central station electric power generation to be introduced as rapidly as possible with a minimum of dislocation. 97 Finally, competitive pressures unleashed by decontrol of petroleum and
natural gas are creating intense interfuel competition that is render-

ing the costs of using fuel oil and natural gas very competitive with
the cost of electricity for many heating tasks."8 In a competitive environment, electric utilities may be handicapped by the slow response

of public utility regulatory systems to the dynamics of energy
94. For example, in March, 1984, Merrill Lynch issued a report predicting that natural
gas shortages could occur as early as this year, as a result of rising gas demands, lower drilling
rates, and overestimates of deliverability from existing sources. Merrill Lynch Cites Possibility
of Shortages; Hodel Concerned, 12 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 224 (Mar. 15, 1984). See
PanelistsDiffer on Possibility of Gas Shortages in Mid, Late 1980's, 12 ENERGY USERS REP.
(BNA) 311, 312 (Apr. 12, 1984) (natural gas shortages inevitable within 3 years). But see
Senator Says Efforts on Gas Pricing Should Aim at Improving House's Compromise, 12
ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 407 (May 10, 1984) (shortages in gas supply are unlikely); Tussing & Barlow, A Survival Strategy for Gas Companies in the Post-OPECEra, PUB. UTIL
FORT., Feb. 3, 1983, at 13-14 (the current gas glut is a demand-side phenomenon that has
ended gas shortages for good). See also Foley, Electric Utility Financing- Let's Ease Off the
PanicButton, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 6, 1983, at 21, 24-27 (summarizing and critiquing contemporary predictions of electric power shortages).
95. See Cook, supra note 78, at 83.
96.

See

CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMM'N, ENERGY TOMORROW:

CHALLENGES & OPPOR-

107-09 (1981) [hereinafter cited as CAL. ENERGY COMM'N];
Thompson, The Strategic Dilemma of Electric Utilities-PartII, PuB. UTIL FORT., Apr. 1,
1982, at 25-27; Morgenstern & Dubinsky, A Utility-financed Weatherization Program in the
Mid-Atlantic Region: The Economics, PUB. UTIL FORT., Jan. 20, 1983, at 11.
97. See CAL ENERGY COMM'N, supra note 96, at 85-109; J. LAITOs, ECONOMIC & REGTUNITIES FOR CALIFORNIA

ULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY UTILITY INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL & DECENTRALIZED SOLAR
APPLICATIONS 9-32 (1981).

98. See Sawhill & Silverman, Do UtilitiesHave Strategic Options? Ask the Customer,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 31, 1983, at 13, 16-17; O'Keefe, EvaluatingUtility-sponsoredConservation Programs: An Integrated Approach, Pua. UTIL FORT., Jan. 20, 1983, at 23-24;

London, The Prospectsfor a Decade of Falling Energy Prices & Their Implications, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Oct. 27, 1983, at 21.
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markets. 99
Given the reluctance of many electric utilities to engage in new
construction projects in the face of intense interfuel competition, and
the significant uncertainty as to future energy developments, the
electric power industry may be the focal point of any future energy
crisis. Current wisdom suggests that, by 1995, petroleum products
and natural gas may be unable to play their historic role in meeting
the energy needs of consumers, and that conservation and alternative
energy sources will not be able to take up the slack. 100 Electricity
generated from coal or nuclear power is widely assumed to be the
only viable option for filling any energy demand-supply gap.101 If the
economic recovery is sustained, the new regulatory and legislative
preoccupation may be to find ways to goad reluctant utility companies into undertaking new construction projects.
III.

PUBLIC UTILITY POLICY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
REVISING THE FRAMEWORK

The overriding task for public utility policy as the industry
moves towards the next century is to revise the traditional public
utility framework to coincide with current economic conditions,
while retaining features of the framework that continue to operate
effectively. This task may be extremely difficult to undertake due to
the uncertainty inherent in making long term forecasts regarding energy prices, energy demands, and the availability of traditional energy sources, and by the possibility of technological breakthroughs
that could render current central power station technologies obsolete
before the end of their normal operating lives. What is certain is that
the six regulatory building blocks10 2 are ill-suited for shepherding the
electric power industry and its customers through the instability involved in the transformation of the United States into a post-industrial twenty-first century economy.
99. The concern here is the response of regulators to utility initiatives for adopting rate
programs designed to make their services more cost competitive through the integration of
traditional utility services with alternative conservation and energy production technologies.
See Johnson, How Competitive Marketing Can Rebuild Electricity Growth, PUB. UTIL FORT.,
July 7, 1983, at i1; Joskow, supra note 63, at 1, 7-17; J. LAITOS, supra note 97, at 20-22, 2628; CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, supra note 96, at 103-04; Scranton, Reforming & Improving Electric Utility Regulation, PUB. UTIL FORT., Aug. 4, 1983, at 19; London, supra note 98, at 24.
100. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY IN TRANSITION 1985-2010: FINAL
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR AND'ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SYSTEMs

101.

See id. at 70; TECHNOLOGY

68-72 (1979).

FUTURES, INC. AND SCIENTIFIC FORESIGHT, INC., PRIN-

CIPLES FOR ELECTRIC POWER POLICY 12 (1984).

102. See supra text accompanying notes 1-54.
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A.

Rate Reform

-

Marginal Opportunity Costs

In an uncertain and competitive energy market, a utility's historic average costs are an inappropriate standard for determining
utility rates. Currently, costs of production for public utilities generally increase as new facilities are added to existing systems.103 Rates
based on a utility's historic average costs thus tend to understate the

cost of supplying additional energy and send inaccurate consumption
signals to energy users.'0 4 Faced with understated prices, demands

for electricity are greater than they would be if consumers had to
pay a full rate for the power supplied from new facilities. As a consequence, pressures for new utility construction develop on the basis
of false demand signals.' 0 5 If new plant construction is actually undertaken, utility costs, and therefore utility rates, will rise, often to

levels that inhibit demands from reaching any level close to that previously predicted. Undesirable excess capacity is the result.

Besides increasing the likelihood of constructing redundant utility facilities, historic average cost rates impede energy innovation.
Emerging energy technologies may be able to supply additional energy services at costs which are lower than those that would be incurred if the additional energy services were supplied by new utility

facilities. Yet, if offered the lower historic average cost rates, consumers will continue to register false demands for additional utility
service, thereby stripping the emerging technologies of any advantage they may have.

08

103. See Cooke, supra note 78, at 83.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
105. See Joskow, supra note 63, at 5-7, 17-18; In re Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 5
P.U.R.4th 28, 43-49 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974) (Eich, Comm'r, concurring) (discussing
need to revise rate structures to reflect true demands and costs).
106. See I SOLAR ENERGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 97TH CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT ON BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE at 157-61
(Comm. Print 1981). Consumers using alternative energy systems often continue to depend on
public power to some degree. For example, solar and wind systems do not operate at all times.
When they are not in operation, their owners require a back-up source of energy. If that backup source is electricity, and if that electricity is priced above the utility's cost of supplying it,
the use of alternative energy will not achieve economic levels. On the other hand, if the utility
sells back-up power at rates that fail to cover its costs of service, the use of alternative energy
systems is subsidized. See J. LAITOS, supra note 97, at 12-17; S. FELDMAN & R. WIRTSHAFTER,
ON THE ECONOMICS OF SOLAR ENERGY: THE PUBLIC-UTILITY INTERFACE 151-52 (1980). Finally, some alternative energy systems, especially wind and cogeneration systems, at times
generate more electricity than their owners can use. The potential for selling the excess electricity at a reasonable rate obviously will affect the economics of such alternative energy systems. The Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (1982)
requires utilities to purchase power from qualifying cogenerators and small power producers at
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Establishing utility rates by reference to the utilities' marginal
or long run incremental costs only partially corrects the problem.
Such an introspective approach presumes that whatever their level,
the utilities' marginal production costs can be passed on to consumers without affecting demands for electricity. This presumption was
thoroughly discredited by the events of the 1970's. 107 In competitive
energy markets, consumers on the margin have energy consumption
and conservation technology choices involving a variety of price-reliability-quantity tradeoffs.108 The percentage of marginal energy demands that any specific technology can capture is affected greatly by
the relationship of its price-reliability-quantity package to those
available through competing technologies.109 Therefore, the marginal
costs from which electric rates should be derived are the marginal
opportunity costs associated with energy consumption and conservation activities of truly marginal electricity consumers.
To derive a marginal opportunity electric rate, the truly marginal electricity consumers must be identified. Three types of energy
consumers can be considered truly marginal: (1) persons seeking
new, expansion or replacement energy services through the purchase
of energy consuming equipment they will operate themselves; 10° (2)
persons with opportunities to lower the costs of current energy consuming activities through the use of energy conservation technologies; and (3) persons for whom the benefits of their current energy
consuming activities are less than the lowest non-electric opportunity
costs of continuing that activity.""
a rate not to exceed "the incremental cost to the electric utility of alternative electric energy."
But see McElwain, A Regulatory Negation of Efficient Use and Just Rates, PuB. UTIL FORT.,
June 9, 1983, at 119 (contending that PURPA requires utilities and their customers to subsidize inefficient electricity generating facilities by requiring that they buy electricity from
cogenerators and small power producers even when they have no need for power).
107. See supra notes 69-86 and accompanying text.
108. See generally Wildes, Marginal-Cost Pricing: Theory and Practice, in CURRENT
ISSUES IN PUBLIC-UTILITY ECONOMICS 169 (A. Danielsen & D. Kamerschen eds. 1983).
109. Id.
110. It is important that reference be made to persons who will operate the energy using
equipment themselves, because otherwise certain distortions might appear. For example, a
home developer may select heating equipment on the basis of its installation price rather than

its operating cost, in order to keep the purchase price of each house as low as possible. Such a
person is not a truly marginal energy consumer.
11l. To a certain extent, this inquiry requires consideration of the abilities to pay of
ratepayers for whom electricity is the most desirable or only feasible energy source. Great care

must be taken to focus on class ability to pay, rather than individual ability to pay; otherwise,
inefficient operations will be subsidized at the expense of their more efficient competitors. See
generally McElwain, supra note 106.
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Once the truly marginal customers are identified, the marginal
opportunity rates for each rate class will be the price just low enough
to keep the marginal customer from turning to alternatives."' 2 However, the utility should be forbidden to charge rates below its out-ofpocket cost of service. 113 Nor should any customer class be charged
an excessively high rate, simply because 4it does not have feasible
alternatives to the use of electric power."

112. See E. DOLAN, BASIC MICRO ECONOMIcS 25-26 (3rd ed. 1983).
113. See I A.E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES

& INSTITUTIONS

163-64 n.8 (1970) ("Normally, the proper level of cost by which to judge a rate is the longterm out-of-pocket cost . . . .") (citation omitted).
114. Perhaps the ceiling should be the rate, or some politically determined multiple
thereof, at which the customer class contributes its competitive share of either the company's
joint/common long run marginal costs or its joint/common current average cost, whichever is
greater. The company's joint long run marginal costs are the long run costs associated with
producing a composite output of services that can only be produced through methods involving
joint costs. Joint long run marginal costs include long run costs, capacity and variable costs
involved in joint production activities, and long run variable costs associated with each separate service. See 1 A.E. KAHN, supra note 113, at 80-83, 92-93. Each service's competitive
share of the company's joint long run marginal costs is derived from the intersection of its long
run demand curve and its long run competitive supply curve. The competitive supply curve for
each service is determined by calculating, at each output level, the total contributions toward
the company's joint long run marginal costs that will be made by purchasers of other services,
and by determining how much additional revenue will be needed from the purchasers of the
remaining service to fully cover the company's joint long run marginal cost of service. The long
run demand curves for each service will in part be determined by the availability and price of
alternative services. Id. at 80-86.
This method requires utilities to establish rate classes comprised of customers whose end
uses impose substantially identical demands on the system. For example, space heating for
moderate size homes has characteristics very similar to space heating for small commercial
establishments and, therefore, should be subject to the same rates. Under the rate classes established in most utility systems, these similar uses would be subject to different rates. Time of
use is another important consumption characteristic that must be considered. Where metering
is economically feasible, time-of-day rates should be employed. See Cady, Everything You
Always Wanted to Hear About Rate Making But Were Afraid to Ask!, PUB. UTIL FORT.,
Aug. 4, 1983, at 24 (calling for the adoption of voltage level-two part demand energy rates
that are time differentiated); Caves & Christensen, Time-of-Use Rates for Residential Electric Service: Resultsfrom the Wisconsin Experiment, PUB. UTIL FORT., Mar. 17, 1983, at 30
(reporting results indicating that residential time-of-use rates can result in substantial declines
in electricity consumption during peak periods).
Rates based on current joint average costs would assign revenue responsibilities on the
basis of demand elasticities, with those services with the least elastic demands bearing the
greatest responsibilities. In this manner, the company's current revenue needs will be met with
minimal departures from the company's optimal output level. See I A.E. KAHN supra note
113, at 141-46, 155.
A third departure from marginal opportunity cost pricing might be justified in the case
where a utility company faces prolonged periods when its capacity level is below the long run
equilibrium level. Under such conditions, the long run marginal opportunity cost rate will be
below the market clearing price (the price where the amount of service capacity supplied
equals the amount of service demanded). To avoid shortages, the rates for each service pro-
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The major advantage flowing from the adoption of marginal opportunity cost rates will be the full integration of the electric utility
industry into the nation's energy markets. With electric power rates
set at the consumers' marginal opportunity costs, new utility construction projects will be undertaken only when the opportunity cost
rates are high enough to finance them. 115 When marginal opportunity cost rates are too low to support new utility construction
projects, any demands for energy that cannot be met by existing utility services will be met by alternative energy production and conservation technologies, and marginally desirable energy consuming activities will be curtailed.1 6 By allowing electric utility rates to rise
when the marginal opportunity costs are greater than the utilities'
historic average cost, the consumers' long-term demands for electricity can be determined before new utility construction is
undertaken." 7
Marginal opportunity cost rates will prevent the "captured customer-death spiral syndrome." The syndrome occurs during periods
of intense interfuel competition, and when rates are set primarily to
cover the utilities' total operating costs. At such times regulators
tend to permit utilities which experience losses of customers to alternative energy or conservation technologies, to increase the rates of
their remaining customers in order to recover the fixed costs associated with serving the lost customers." 8 This shifting of fixed cost
burdens can result in the surviving customers paying rates in excess
of the utilities' costs of serving them and, in some cases, in excess of
the marginal opportunity costs of the marginal customer within the
rate class. The short-term consequence of this cost shifting is that
the remaining customers begin taking political action because they
perceive that they are being unfairly treated as captured customers." 9 The long-term consequence may be that the utilities involved
will enter into a death spiral, as customer losses trigger rate invided should be raised to the market clearing level. While this rate adjustment would avoid
shortages in the economic sense, it would also provide the company with excess profits and
price some, if not many, historic customers out of the market. Id. at 91-92. As a consequence,
this rationing by price might be too controversial to be politically feasible.
115. See I A.E. KAHN, supra note 113, at 65-67.
116. See id. at 77-83.
117. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., In re Tampa Elec. Co., 37 P.U.R.3d 65, 78-80 (Fla. R.R. & P.U.C.
1960).
119. See 1 A.E. KAHN, supra note 113, at 140-58.
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creases that cause further customer losses.12°
By contrast, since marginal opportunity cost rates represent the
true competitive value of electric service to the marginal consumer,
they establish a rate level for each service that cannot be exceeded
no matter how much customer loss a utility is experiencing. 21 There
will be no captured customer. The rates for each service will be set
by reference to the price responsiveness of customers who have alternative energy opportunities rather than by calculation of how much
revenue can be exacted without bankrupting customers who are
locked into their current energy technologies. 122 Utilities will encounter a death spiral only when they are mismanaged or encounter competition from superior energy and conservation technologies.12 3
Death spirals attributable to mismanagement should be remedied
through changes in management rather than by overcharging captured customers. Death spirals resulting from superior competition
simply should not be prevented. Instead, competitively induced death
spirals should be managed so that society gets maximum efficient use
of existing electric generating and distributing facilities. This can occur only when electric utility rates are set no higher than the electric
power customers' costs of using alternative energy or conservation
technologies. 24
B. Competitive Rates of Return
Rates based on marginal opportunity costs of marginal electric
power customers will produce rates of return limited only by competition. Competitive rates of return may be higher or lower than those
that have been permitted under the public finance standards incorporated into traditional utility ratemaking practices. 125 While rates of
return in excess of the public finance standard will be politically controversial, clarity about public utility policy goals should prevent
such controversy from overwhelming needed rate reforms. The number one public utility policy goal must be to take measures that will
induce utilities to provide an appropriate level of utility service, using the most appropriate technology available. Rates based on mar120.

Id.

121. Id. at 66-70.
122. Id. at 175-81.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 23-25, 49-52 and accompanying text; In re Madison Gas & Elec.
Co., 5 P.U.R.4th 28, 50-52 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974) (Cudahy, Comm'r, concurring).
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ginal opportunity costs achieve this goal. The marginal opportunity
cost rate standard will help utilities make more appropriate construction decisions because it sends a price signal that accurately reflects
electric power customers' true demands for electricity. 126 Rates set
at a level where the utilities' rates of return will conform to the public finance standard will perpetuate the undervaluing of electricity
that led to excessive electricity demands and the retardation in the
development of alternative energy and conservation during the
1970's.
. Marginal opportunity cost rates, set in accordance with the true
value to consumers of the electricity they are currently using, will
not require current utility customers to subsidize future utility customers; rather, current customers will pay the competitive value of
the electricity they use. 127 If customers continue to demand electricity in the wake of rates above historic average cost standards, a demand for electricity exists that warrants the expansion of electric
power facilities through new construction projects. Furthermore, the
cash flow generated by marginal opportunity cost rates may reduce
the risks that new construction of needed facilities will be aborted
due to financial difficulties.
In contrast, limiting utilities' rates of return to levels below the
marginal opportunity cost rates may deter utilities from constructing
new facilities where genuine demand exists. Cash flow problems have
bedeviled recent utility construction projects. 128 Attempts to cure the
utility cash flow problems through rate manipulations such as construction work in progress (CWIP) have failed largely because they
suggest that utilities can raise rates in an effort to support construction decisions whether or not long-term demand for the facilities exists.1219 CWIP is especially offensive to ratepayers because it appears
126.

See Joskow, supra note 63, at 17-18. At minimum, if utilities are to be held to a

public finance rate of return, the limitation should be imposed by excess profits taxes rather
than by reducing rates below the marginal opportunity cost level. Profit control by taxation at
least preserves the price signal consumers must confront if they are to register accurately their

demands for electricity. See also Allison, supra note 87, at 732-34 (discussing use of windfall
profits).
127.

See I A.E.

KAHN,

supra note 113, at 66-70.

128. See Cook, supra note 78, at 82-84.
129. See In re Washington Water Power Co., 48 P.U.R.4th 533, 541-43 (Idaho P.U.C.
1982). The Idaho Commission stated that:
Stockholders provide capital for investment in new plant. In exchange for a return
on that investment, the stockholders incur certain risks. Those risks have become
painfully apparent in the Northwest in recent months with the collapse of one nuclear project after another. The full history of these projects has yet to be told, but

1985]

IMPRUDENT POWER PROJECTS

to charge them a price for something that is not providing service,
1 30
and in fact may never provide service.
In addition to providing a more accurate indication of when new
utility construction is warranted, competitive returns are justified by
the increased risks investors face in today's energy market. The public finance standard rate of return is appropriate for investments in
low risk endeavors. 13s The risks associated with operating public utilities have increased significantly in recent years. Inflation, recession,
high interest rates, wildly fluctuating oil prices, insecure oil supplies,
and rapid advances in competing technologies have made the prediction of future electricity demands an extremely difficult task.132 Certainly, the number of utilities which have experienced financial
problems, as a result of misguided construction decisions, is a clear
indication of the increased risks utility investors are currently facing.133 These risks will only increase as future technological advances
offer the potential for rendering central station electric power facilities uneconomical.134 Therefore, if the rates of return generated by
marginal opportunity cost rates are higher than those generated by
the public finance standard, they reflect both a sustained demand for
electricity and the higher risks a competitive energy market imposes
on investors in central station electric power utilities. Correlating the
investors' rates of returns with the risks they take is necessary in
order to attract the external capital utilities need to engage in new
utility construction projects for which there is a demonstrable
it is obvious that a great deal of the blame can be traced to lack of oversight and of

diligent managerial supervision. It is entirely proper that shareholders bear the risks
occasioned by corporate managerial decisions. Exclusion of CWIP from rate base is

one means of providing an incentive to bring projects on linein a timely and budget
conscious manner.
Id. at 542-43.
130.

Id. at 541-43. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. See also In re Wash-

ington Water Power Co., 44 P.U.R.4th 1, 9-11, reh'g denied, (on issue of disallowance of
CWIP in rate base), 44 P.U.R.4th 27, 30 (Idaho P.U.C. 1981); In re Georgia Power Co., 33
P.U.R.4th I, 2-5 (Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1979) (company's intention to sell assets prior to

ratepayers' benefit from such assets, relevant to disallowance of CWIP in rate base).
131.

See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.

132. See supra notes 70-99 and accompanying text; A. CARRON & P. MACAvoY, supra
note 57, at 64-69; London, supra note 98, at 21; Thompson, The Strategic Dilemma of Elec-

tric Utilities-PartI, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 18, 1982, at 19; Dukes & Chandy, Rate of Return & Risk for Public Utilities, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 1, 1983, at 35.
133. See Cook, supra note 78, at 82-83.
134. See Lagassa, Implementing the Soft Path in a Hard World: Decentralizationand

the Problem of Electric Power Grids, in
87 (1982).

ENERGY POLICY AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
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demand.13 5

Providing utilities with opportunities to earn returns in excess of
the public finance standard may give utilities greater incentive to engage in effective cost control, or in research and development that
will accelerate the introduction of better energy production and conservation technologies. Under the public finance standard return, any
cost savings achieved by a utility company is passed through to ratepayers in the form of rate reductions during the utility company's
next rate case. Since public finance returns are inadequate to support
long-term research and development, utilities are reluctant to engage
in such activity where specific grants for such purposes are not part
of their approved operating costs.136 With the company's revenues
determined by competitive conditions, the company will have the
power to increase or decrease its rate of return through effective cost
control. Any returns in excess of the public finance standard can be
used to expand customer services, engage in research and development, and reward investors and employees. Limits on the uses of
these returns will be dictated by competitive necessity rather than by
regulatory fiat.
Finally, we know that prior to the 1970's, utilities enjoyed cash
flows sufficient for meeting current operating expenses, financing
new construction projects, and providing stockholders with attractive
returns on their investments.137 This suggests that electric utility
rates of return above the public finance standard represent the his135. See A. CARRON & P. MAcAvoY, supra note 57, at 67-68; Dukes & Chandy, supra
note 132, at 35; Jordan, Is America Pulling the Plug on the Future, PuB. UTIL FORT., Jan. 6,
1983, at II (calling for regulators to assure utilities of rates of return adequate to attract
investments needed for future growth).
136. See generally Carlson & Rider, Incentives for Research by Utilities, PUB. UTIL
FORT., Mar. 3, 1983, at 15-20 (discussing importance of research to the utility industry).
Commissions strictly scrutinize research, development and demonstration (R.D.&D.) expenses
and will not include them in utility rates unless the research projects have direct value to the
utility's jurisdictional service area and will produce products or services that will be used and
useful to its ratepayers within a fairly short period of time. Generalized R.D.&D., and longterm R.D.&D. are the types of research projects commissions prefer the unregulated private
sector to handle. See In re Southern Cal. Edison Co., 50 P.U.R.4th 317, 352-56 (Cal. P.U.C.
1982). Compare the treatment of long-term R.D. & D. expenses associated with coal gasification for a single project by the Indiana Public Service Commission, In re Public Serv. Co., 51
P.U.R.4th 6, 24-25 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983) (expenses disallowed because "current
ratepayers should not have to bear the burden for a project whose advantages to them are
remote"), with that accorded the same project by the Ohio Public Utilities Commission, In re
Ohio Edison Co., 55 P.U.R.4th 423, 461 (Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1983) (expenses allowed
despite remoteness of benefits).
137. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
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torical norm, while the public finance standard rates of return of the
1970's were aberrations. If this suggestion has merit, then any rates
of return above the public finance standard generated by marginal
opportunity cost rates will be compatible with historical notions of
fairness and adequacy.
When utility rates of return generated by marginal opportunity
cost rates fall below both the public finance standard and the levels
needed to finance new utility construction projects, no attempts
should be made to increase them through either rate increases or
subsidies. Absent mismanagement, such circumstances will occur
only when superior alternatives to central station electric power are
developed. 38 Any attempts to increase the electric power rates of
return will either cause captured customers to pay more than they
should, or deprive emerging new technologies of their natural advantages. If the rescue attempts are extreme, they might even induce
new utility construction of facilities that are obsolete the day the
39
construction is initiated.
C. Nonexclusive Service Areas
The possibility exists that utilities can earn high rates of return
from marginal opportunity cost rates and still decline to initiate demand-justified utility construction projects.140 To ensure that excessive timidity by incumbent utility companies does not deprive some
service areas of the electric power they require, the traditional exclusive utility franchise should be discontinued. Abolishing the concept
of exclusivity will open up new service areas to aggressive, well-managed electric utility companies. This intrafuel competition will protect consumers from inadequate service, especially if the rates offered by competing electric power companies are used in calculating
electric power customers' marginal opportunity costs.
Intrafuel competition may also protect service areas from suboptimal utility construction choices by incumbent utility companies.
It may be that for a given service area, nuclear power generation is
the optimal technology choice for the next electric generating facility. Yet, the incumbent utility may lack the financial resources to
138.
139.

140.

See 1 A.E. KAHN, supra note 113 at 175-81.
See Joskow, supra note 63, at 2-3.
See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text. See also R. SCHMALENSEE, THE

CONTROL OF NATURAL MONOPOLIEs

3-7 (1979). The original justification for regulating cen-

tral station utilities was that, as natural monopolies, they had the power to produce sub-competitive levels of output at prices above the competive level. Id.
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complete successfully the construction of a nuclear power plant. If
intrafuel competition is permitted, a utility company with greater financial resources and the proven ability to manage the successful
construction and operation of nuclear power plants could step in as
14
the provider of the new power facility. '
Enhanced consumer protection could also arise from intrafuel
competition if regulators use the negotiating process to bind the winning company to some performance guarantees. If the right to construct a new facility is granted under conditions conducive to intrafuel competition, the winner will have convinced the regulators
that it can outperform its competitors. 42 Therefore, regulators
should insist that their service area receives the benefits of the bargain made with the winning utility company.
In the past, the principal objection to permitting intrafuel competition was that the electric utility industry is a decreasing cost industry, and therefore the maximum demands of each service area
can be met most efficiently by a single electric power company. 4 3 In
contrast, most utility systems today have reached or exceeded their
available economies of scale.14 4 New utility facilities, whether for replacement or expansion purposes, are more costly to build and operate than existing utility facilities. In this increasing cost environment, no significant cost savings are achieved by simply granting the
incumbent company the exclusive privilege of supplying new facilities for replacement or expansion purposes. To the contrary, permitting intrafuel competition for the right to serve demands that would
otherwise require the incumbent company to build new facilities
could produce enormous cost savings, especially in situations where
the demands involved can be met by the use of excess capacity
within the systems of nonincumbent utility companies. 45
In many service areas, incumbent central station electric power
companies are already facing strong intrafuel competition to the extent that selfgeneration and cogeneration facilities used by utility
customers are considered intrafuel competition. 6 Regulators permit
this competition to occur despite the arguments by incumbent utili141. See Thompson, supra note 96, at 29; London, supra note 98, at 23-24.
142. This competition could be on a bid-for-the-market basis, the virtues of which were
well described in Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, II J. LAW & EcoN. 55 (1968).

143.
144.
22-23.
145.
146.

R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 140, at 3.
See A. Carron & P. MacAvoy, supra note 57, at 40; Thompson, supra note 132, at
London, supra note 98, at 23-24.
See McElwain, supra note 106, at 119; Thompson, supra note 132, at 27-28.
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ties that these customer-competitors are making cost savings through
1 47
load management more difficult.
If the load management argument is an insufficient justification
for protecting utilities from the competition of selfgenerators and
cogenerators, it should also be an insufficient justification for protecting incumbent utilities from the competition of other central station
power companies. Indeed, through the power pooling devices now
used extensively to interconnect the utility companies of several service areas for purposes of assuring greater reliability and efficiency
of service, utility companies and regulators have already gained experience in securing electricity for single service areas from multiple
central station sources. 4 8
D. DiscretionaryService
It is time to return the service-to-all requirement to its original
purpose of preventing discrimination in the provision of essential services.1 4 9 In a competitive energy environment fraught with uncertainties as to future economic and technological conditions, 5 0 it is
increasingly difficult to maintain cross-subsidy systems designed to
support economic development and to provide social welfare. It is
also no longer appropriate to enlist historic utility customers as involuntary guarantors of investments in new electric power facilities
built to stimulate or support projected economic growth.
Every cross-subsidy system requires regulators to designate certain customers for the "honor" of paying rates higher than the utility
company's costs of service so that other customers can receive a rate
subsidy.1 5 ' As competition increases and technological advances enable competing energy producers to lower their prices, it becomes
increasingly difficult for utility companies to retain the business of
such burdened customers. Often, burdened ratepayers leave the electric power system because the utility company serving them cannot
secure timely regulatory permission to lower its rates in response to
the price competition offered by unregulated competitors.' 52
147. See McElwain, supra note 106, at 119.
148.

See generally FEDERAL

ENERGY REGULATORY COMIM'N, POWER POOLING IN THE

UNITED STATES (1981); id. at 9 (showing a table of the major formal power pools in the

United States, which as of 1980 accounted for 546,662 megawatts, or about 44% of the nation's generating capacity).
149. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 33-44 and accompanying text.
152. Id. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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As burdened ratepayers leave electric power systems, the per
customer cost of maintaining the cross-subsidy system increases, and
the remaining customers become more vulnerable to the enticements
of competing energy services. In the end, either the cross-subsidy
system has to be abandoned or the electric utility company and its
service area will suffer the economic stagnation that usually accompanies the inefficient allocation of important resources.15 3 Either result is inconsistent with the purposes that the cross-subsidies were
designed to serve. Therefore, it is simply counterproductive to engage
in cross-subsidization in an increasingly competitive market.
With the time frames involved in constructing and operating
electric generation facilities stretching outward from thirty-five to
forty years, and given the immense changes occurring within the
world economy, the risks involved in constructing new electric power
generating facilities are escalating rapidly.5 4 These risks are now so
great that steps must be taken to insure that no electric power construction projects are undertaken without the benefit of exacting
analyses of future energy demands and economic conditions. These
analyses are unlikely to be made if regulators continue to require
utilities to meet any contemporary demands for service and to permit
utilities to pass on the risks of constructing uneconomical facilities to
their ratepayers.
Utility companies should be given the discretion to refuse to expand their facilities when they believe current demands will not last
long enough to justify construction. This discretion would put the
risk of making suboptimal utility construction decisions squarely on
the shoulders of utility managers. Implicit in this policy change is
the idea that the marginal opportunity cost rate will, in part, be determined by what it would have cost the power company to produce
electricity had it made an optimal construction decision.
Once utilities are denied the opportunity of using their ratepayers as guarantors of new electric power construction projects, they
should be permitted the latitude to secure other guarantor arrangements. For example, if a new company wishes to relocate within a
utility company's service area, and that relocation will increase demands for electricity to a level that cannot be accommodated with153. See In re Gas & Elec. Util. Rate Structure, 24 P.U.R.4th 332, 347-48 (Cal. P.U.C.
1978) (Symons and Sturgeon, Comm'rs, dissenting).
154. See Sawhill & Silverman, Build Flexibility - Not Power Plants, PuB. UTIL
FORT., May 26, 1983, at 17; Jordon, supra note 135, at 13-14; Thompson, supra note 132, at
21, 26.
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out new electric power generating facilities, the utility company and
the relocating company should be allowed to enter into a contract
service arrangement that makes the relocating company the guarantor of the new construction project. Such a contract might require
the relocating company to purchase its energy from the utility company throughout the operating life of the new electric power facilities, or to pay damages that cover the utility's losses attributable to
155
the relocating company leaving the system.
E. Multiple Review of ConstructionDecisions
It might seem that ratepayers are adequately protected from the
negative consequences of inappropriate utility construction decisions
when utility companies are completely responsible for losses arising
from unsuccessful utility construction projects. Indeed, as intrafuel
competition increases and new technologies become readily available
substitutes for electricity generated by central station utilities, regulation of electric power construction decisions will not be necessary.
Once adequate substitutes are available, most electric power customers will not be drastically disadvantaged if their local central station
electric power company is driven into bankruptcy or near bankruptcy
156
by construction losses.
Substitutes for central station electricity are not yet available in
sufficient quantities, and intrafuel competition among central station
electric power companies is minimal. Further, until utility rates are
based on marginal opportunity costs, consumers will not be protected
from rate increases resulting from imprudent utility construction
projects. 157 With the advent of new competitive technologies on the
horizon, utility construction decisions are now riskier than at any
time during the modern history of the electric power industry. So,
for now, utility company decisions to initiate new utility construction
projects must remain under regulatory supervision.
The regulatory supervision of new utility construction projects
must, in fact, be tightened. At a time when accurate long-term prediction of economic, technological, and political conditions is all but
impossible, one-time approvals of utility construction projects with
completion times between five and twelve years are invitations to dis155. See Plummer, A Different Approach to Electricity Deregulation,PUB. UTIL FORT.,
July 7, 1983, at 16.
156. Indeed, the likely substitute is lower cost energy supplied by a more efficient electric utility than the local incumbent. See London, supra note 98, at 21.
157. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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aster. To keep abreast of changing conditions that might warrant the
delay or cancellation of new projects, periodic reviews of electric
power demands, and of the comparative abilities of various sources
of services to meet them, must be made to insure that regulated utilities respond rationally to market signals with respect to their construction projects.158
The thrust of periodic utility construction reviews need not be
restricted to adversarial examinations of specific utility construction
projects. These periodic reviews should determine the energy needs
of a state or region for a given period, and the competitive abilities
of various sources of energy services available for meeting those
needs. 1 9 The evidence received should not be confined merely to the
economics of particular utility companies, but should include projections of general economic and technological trends as well as the
stated development goals of the state and the economic entities

involved.160
Only through this broader examination can utility company decisions be firmly interconnected with the needs of current and potential consumers of electric power. Only an advanced planning approach can break the past precedent of electric power users
implementing plans requiring new electric power facilities on the
158, Electricity demands and costs must be monitored closely to avoid saddling ratepayers with uncompetitive energy sources. See supra note 86.
159. The State of Wisconsin currently requires electric power utilities to engage in biennial advanced planning involving a 10-year planning horizon. In submitting advanced plans for
approval, utilities must consider alternatives to proposed electric power construction projects,
projected demands for electricity, and the company's relationship with other utilities, regional
associations, power pools, and power networks. Utilities also are required to submit copies of
their advanced plans to all affected regulatory agencies, regional planning commissions, countiei and cities. Written comments from any affected county, city or person are solicited. See
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.491 (Vest Supp. 1984). An advanced plan will be approved only if it:
1. Will provide for a reasonably adequate supply of electrical energy to meet the
needs of the public during the planning period;
2. Is in the public interest when considering engineering, economic, health, safety,
reliability, efficiency and environmental factors and alternate methods of generation or sources of supply; and
3. Is reasonably coordinated with long-range plans and policies of other agencies
or that a reasonable effort has been made to coordinate with such plans and
policies.
4. Provides for programs which discourage inefficient and excessive power use.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.491(2)(i) (West Supp. 1984).
160. Id. For a discussion of factors state public utility commissioners should consider
when determining proper conditions for utility construction, see Allison, Judging the Prudence
of Constructing Nuclear Power Plants: A Report to the Oklahoma Corporation Commission,
15 TULSA L.J. 262 (1979).
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presumption that the local electric power company can, and will, automatically provide the services they desire in a timely and efficient
manner. Only through comparative analyses of the capabilities and
characteristics of alternative sources of energy services will it be possible to insure that energy users, as well as energy providers, make
fully informed choices when selecting an energy technology to meet
their needs or responsibilities.
Although it might seem unfair to make electric power companies responsible for their construction losses while permitting the
state to command delays or cancellations of their projects already in
progress, this perceived unfairness would be mitigated by giving electric power companies the absolute right to refuse to engage in new
construction projects. The opportunity to earn rates of return in excess of public finance standards, by charging market-valued marginal opportunity cost rates, would also mitigate any unfairness inherent in state retention of the power to terminate utility construction
projects.
F. Diversification Opportunities
The combination of unstable economic and political conditions
and the emergence of vigorous interfuel competition is eroding much
of the rationale for restricting the diversification opportunities of
electric power companies. The best efforts of regulators and electric
power company managers failed to insulate the central station electric power industry from increases in the risks of doing business.,61
As a consequence, fears that a utility company faces greater risks of
loss when it makes diversified investments may no longer be justified.
There is still reason to be concerned about sweetheart deals with
affiliated suppliers.162 If reforms in ratemaking lead to the adoption
of marginal opportunity cost rates, however, electric utility companies' incentives to engage in sweetheart arrangements with affiliate
suppliers will be significantly diminished. With rates limited by the
competitive opportunities of marginal electric power consumers, a
utility company's revenue levels will not be affected by its internal
cost structure. The utility company's net income realizable from its
allowed revenues will be directly affected by its cost structure.
Therefore, electric power companies will have direct profit incentives
to acquire their inputs from the lowest cost suppliers. Under these
161.

See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.

162.

See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
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circumstances, utility companies will make purchases from their affiliates only when their affiliates can offer the best terms of trade.16 3
It would be unfair to discourage diversification by utility companies during an era of intense interfuel competition and technological and structural changes. Competition and change could very well
significantly diminish demands for central station electric power services. Limiting electric power companies to the provision of only one
kind of service at a time of declining demands for that service would,
in effect, condemn them to slow economic death.
A regulated company so condemned would have large incentives
to erect barriers against the development and deployment of new energy production and conservation technologies.1 64 In contrast, an
electric power company with the freedom to diversify into related
businesses might well choose to broaden its operations to provide
other energy sources in addition to electricity. A general energy services company has incentives to develop and market alternative
en16 5
introduction.
their
impede
than
rather
technologies,
ergy
With their well developed customer base, service organizations,
marketing systems, and long business lives, electric power companies
may be regarded by consumers as safer and more reliable sources of
alternative energy technologies than the new, small, and diffused
firms currently dominating the thin alternative energy markets.1 66
Therefore, alternative energy markets might expand at an acceler1 67
ated rate if electric power companies are allowed to enter them.
Diversification might also facilitate better coordination between the
establishment of mature alternative energy markets and the efficient
management of central station electric power loads. 68
163. Any antitrust concern one might have about utility-affiliate supply arrangements
can be adequately dealt with through enforcement of the nation's antitrust laws. Although

business entities regulated by state action are immune from antitrust liability arising from acts
they were required to engage in by affirmative command of the state, Parker v. Brown, 317

U.S. 341 (1943), this exemption does not extend to voluntary acts that are merely approved,
rather than required, by state law or regulation. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). The
Reagan Administration has been very reluctant to challenge vertical business arrangements

that were historically subject to strict antitrust scrutiny. See, for example, Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 n.7 (1984), where the Court notes that the Solicitor
General of the United States entered a brief requesting that the Court reverse its past custom

of regarding vertical price fixing restraints as illegal per se.
164, See supra notes 97 & 106.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.

167. Id.
168.

Id.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

As the twentieth century draws to a close, immense change is
occurring within the United States economy generally, and within
energy markets specifically. Competition and uncertainty are the
prevailing market forces influencing the outcomes of investment decisions within unregulated markets, and increasingly within the regulated public utility sector as well. The traditional public utility policy
framework, premised on economic stability and the ability of regulators to insulate utility companies from competition, continues to
skew market signals that influence electric power companies' decisions to initiate construction of new electric power facilities. In the
1970's, these skewed market signals induced electric power companies to undertake construction projects that either produced redundant or uneconomic electric power facilities, or came to expensive,
premature ends. In the 1980's, these inaccurate market signals may
discourage electric power companies and investors in alternative energy production and conservation technologies from making the investments necessary to avert a shortage of energy services by the
mid-1990's.
For the foreseeable future, regulators will be unable to insulate
central station electric power companies from the increasingly vigorous competition of other energy production and conservation technologies. Any cross-subsidy scheme built into electric power rate designs will become geometrically more difficult to maintain.
Moreover, unless they are given greater freedom to respond quickly
to competition by adjusting rates or diversifying their operations,
central station electric power companies may experience significant
erosions in customer and financial bases. Electric power customers
with financial flexibility sufficient for pursuing alternative energy
services will do so, leaving behind a cadre of captured customers facing rising rates and deteriorating services.
Eventually, the competition facing central station electric power
facilities may become so intense that regulation will not be needed to
provide ratepayers with adequate energy services at reasonable
prices. For now, regulators are contending with an interim situation
where competition is strong enough to destroy the basis of traditional
utility policies, but too weak to be an adequate regulator of utility
markets. During this interim period, the regulators still have a role,
but it cannot be performed successfully unless the traditional public
utility policy framework is changed to integrate utility companies
with, rather than insulate them from, competition.
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To be integrated with its competition, central station electric
power companies must be required to establish rates based on their
marginal customers' opportunity costs of receiving alternative energy
services. By charging marginal opportunity cost rates, central station
electric power companies will be able to measure the true demand
for electric power service. New electric power facilities will be built
if the revenues derived from marginal opportunity cost rates are sufficient to support new construction projects. Otherwise, new electric
power facilities will not be built, and any demands for energy services not covered by existing electric power facilities will be served
by other energy production and conservation technologies.
Opening up each electric power company's service area to the
competition of other electric power companies not only will help keep
rates low, it will supply alternative providers of central station electric power services when incumbent electric power companies lack
the desire or the resources to engage in the construction of new electric power facilities. Allowing competition among electric power
companies may also insure that when new electric power facilities
are built, they are built with the optimal central station technology.
No service area will have to forgo the advantages of new technology
simply because its incumbent utility lacks the financial and managerial resources required to put that technology to use.
To further protect ratepayers from inappropriate electric power
construction projects, electric power companies should have absolute
discretion to refuse to engage in new construction, but their decisions
to initiate new construction should be monitored through periodic
advanced planning proceedings. Giving utilities the right to refrain
from new construction will reduce the number of cross-subsidy systems created by state command. Such cross-subsidy systems cannot
survive in highly competitive markets unless counterproductive inefficiencies are tolerated. Therefore, utility companies and their customers should not be forced into providing facilities for inherently unstable demands that might disappear and leave remaining customers
holding the bag.
Decisions to proceed with new utility construction projects must
remain under regulatory scrutiny until competition supplies, in adequate volume, readily available substitutes for central station electric
power. With economic and technological changes occurring with increasing frequency, accurate predictions as to future energy demands are becoming more difficult to make. Periodic reviews of the
economic conditions and technological advances will keep regulators,

1985]

IMPRUDENT POWER PROJECTS

electric power companies, and electricity consumers abreast of all
available energy options. Advanced planning proceedings will also
ensure that electric power companies will not continue to proceed
with construction projects when changed conditions have rendered
them redundant or uneconomical.
Finally, electric power utilities must be permitted to diversify
their operations. If they are not, they face slow economic death as
new energy production and conservation technologies erode the demands for central station electric power. If they are permitted to
diversify their operations, efficient, well managed electric power
companies will be able to expand their services into areas presently
served by poorly performing incumbents. More importantly, electric
power companies will have incentives to promote, rather than impede, the use of new energy production and conservation technologies in ways that will allow society to gain maximum efficient use of
existing central station electric power facilities and that may accelerate the development of new technology.

